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DUE PROCESS AND THE JUVENILE SYSTEM: 
Th"'E EF~CTS OF IN RE GAULT 
steven A. Samson 
American Civil Liberties 
August 3" 1980 
l10st of the children who come be fore the court are, 
naturally, the children of the poor. In many cases 
the parents are foreigners, frequently unable to speak 
English, and without an understanding of American 
methods and views. What they need, more than anything 
else, is kindly ass istance; and the aim of the court ..... 
is to have the child and the parents feel, not so much 
the power, as the friendly interest of the stateo •• o l 
The juvenile court system was born in Cook County, 
Illinois, in 1899, at the crest of a wave of immigration 
from the less economically developed, less culturally 
familiar areas of southern and eastern Europe. Since the 
Civil \',Jar, the United states had been undergoip..g a cultu..ral 
revolution that transformed the political, social, and 
economic institutions of earlier white, Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant immigrants to adapt to growing cultural 
pluralism. These more recent immigrant groups showed less 
vdllingness to assimilate and were generally less tolerated 
by their predecessors. The social reform movement of that 
era was a curious blend of upper-middle class nativism, 
political activism, and liberal religiono Cultural pluralism, 
in practice, meant conflicting perceptions of proper social 
behavior. Resistance to change by the gentry of the late 
nineteenth century was given positive expression in the 
efforts of social reformers to uplift their "weaker brethren" 
and teach them American ways. Out of the practical, and yet 
I 
idealistic, efforts of ministers and other professionals to 
save the children of immigrants from poverty, ignorance, and 
crime, grew the public education movement, child labor laws, 
1 
Julian W .. Mack, "The Juvenile Court, n 23 Harvard Law 
Review 2 (December, 1909): 116-17. 
2 
reformatories, and juvenile courtse 
In recent years, some liberal social critics have seen 
the efforts of "child savers" to divert children from the 
criminal justice system in a somewhat negative light. One 
critic, Anthony Platt, believes that the severity of that 
system and its impact on youthful sensitivities has been 
exaggerated. Children were rarely incarcerated with hardened 
criminals. In fact, they were generally found to lack the 
essential capacity to commit a crime. Citing fourteen leading 
cases in ftmerican courts from 1806-1882, Platt noted that 
only three children were actually convicred and sentenced: 
two slaves were executed for murder and one eight year old 
boy was sentenced to three years in prison for stealing a 
2 
bear skin from a private house. 
Prison reform, however, was indicative of a gradual trend 
toward liberalization of attitudes toward poverty and crime. 
By the turn of the century, psychological theories of behavior 
were in vogueo Physicians, for example, promoted a ttmedical 
model" of motivation that was transforming criminal juris-
prudence through the insanity defense of the WNaughten rule 
and through the efforts of the younger Oliver 1.Jendell Holmes 
to place law on a scientific footingo Traditional assumptions 
about personal responsibility were called into question. The 
rise of scientific professionalism in law, medicine, and the 
2 
Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of 
Delinquency (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, --
1969), pp. 183-202 0 See also Steven L. Schlossman, Love 
and the American Delinquent: The Theorx and Practice of 
'Progressive' Juvenile Justice, 1825-1920 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1977) on the corrections phase. 
3 
new fields of criminology and social work, restructured the 
treatment of criminal behavior and its underlying causes. One 
product of these changes was a new status, "delinquency," 
which meant, on the one hand, that crimes committed by juveniles 
were redefined so they could be tried in a civil proceeding and, 
on the other hand, that a new set of status offenses was invented 
in order to identify delinquent behavioro The ancient concept 
of parens patriae was used to justify an assertion by juvenile 
judges of firm, paternalistic control and intervention into 
the home., to the point of removip...g the child to a more favorable 
environment--i. e., a reformatory--if deemed necessary. The 
usual elements of court procedure were removed to emphasize 
that the court's purpose was therapeutic, not punitive. This 
placed the judge into the fatherly role of a benefactor, a 
physician for troubled souls. Platt concluded: 
The blurring of distinctions between 'dependent' and 
'delinquent' children and the corresponding elimination 
of due process for juveniles, served to make a social fact 
out of the norm of adolescent dependence. 'Every child 
is dependent,' held the Board of Public Charities o 
'Dependence is a child's natural condition.' It was one 
task of the child savers to punish premature independence 
in children and restrict youthful autonomy. Proponents of 
constitutional protections for children were rebuked for 
impeding the tsystematic and adequate effort for the 
salvation of all the children who are in need of savior. 3 
The juvenile court system even today reflects the character 
of its origins as well as the aspirations of its reformers, the 
experiences of its administrators, and the changing needs of 
changing times. Since the middle 1960s, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has played a leading reform role in a series of 
decisions,beginning with In ~ Gault (1967), which have held 
3 
Platt, Child Savers, pp. 135-36. 
that the denial of certain procedural due process rights is 
Q~constitutional even in juvenile courts, which claim to be 
civil rather than criminal courtso 
4 
In .E.£ Gault came to the 'Harren Court on appeal of the 
dismissal of a petition for Hrit of habeas corpus by the Arizona 
~upreme Court. The appellants were the parents of Gerald Gault" 
vJho had been arrested on June 8.t 1964 by the Sheriff of Gila 
County after allegedly joining a friend in making an obscene 
phone calle His parents i,-Jere not notified of the arrest .. 
Gerald's older brother apparently learned that Gerald was in 
custody when he went to the trailer home of the other boyts 
family.. .f\ hearing was held the following day. The complainant 
did not appear to testify and no transcript or other recording 
was kept. Gerald was released without explanation two or three 
days later" then summoned to appear once again on June 150 
Gerald's mother had attended the first hearing; both parents 
attended this second hearing at which Gerald was committed as 
a juvenile delinquent to the state Industrial School until the 
age of 21" unless discharged sooner. Under Arizona law, no 
appeal was permitted in juvenile cases o 
At the habeas corpus hearing the juvenile judge tttestified 
that he had taken into account the fact that Gerald was on 
5 
probation .. " Two years earlier, Gerald had been referred to the 
court on a complaint that he had stolen another boy's baseball 
gloveo No hearing had been held; no accusation had been made. 
4 
5 
387 U.s. 1, 87 s.ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1967) 
387 U.Se 1, at 8 
5 
Then, during February of 1964, Gerald was placed on probation 
for having been in the company of another boy who had stolen 
a wallet from a lady's purse. He was still on probation when 
the obscenity complaint was made. The judge found that the 
congruence of these circumstances provided sufficient ground 
for classifying Gerald as a delinquent: flone who, as the iudge 
phrased it, is 'habitually involved in immoral matters.,t! 
A presumption of guilt evidently operated in the court. 
After the Superior Court dismissed the writ, the appellants 
sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, challep~ing the 
constitutionality of the Juvenile Court and claiming that the 
conduct of the proceedings had denied due process. The Court 
held that adequate notice was required, but that there was no 
right of appeal and that hearsay evidence could be admitted if 
it was reasonable. 
We approach this challenge to the juvenile code aware of our 
duty to give to the language of all statutes a meaning that 
will render them constitutional if this can reasonably be 
done •••• Although the constitutional guarantee that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law ••• is not expressly implemented 
in the juvenile code, we have held a statute valid in other 
situations though we had to imply into the language a 
necessary element of the problemo 7 
The Court took note of mounting criticisms against juvenile 
proceedings but stated that the juvenile court acts as a protect-
ing parent rather than a prosecutor. tiThe delinquent is the 
child of, rather than the enemy of society and their interests 
8 
coincide." The Court held that counsel could not be denied to 
6 
387 u.s. 1, at 9 (1967) 
7 
407 P.2d 760, at,65 (1965) 
8 
407 P.2d 760, at 765 
6 
parents, although they were not expressly informed of this 
right. If the judge noted a conflict of interest between the 
child and its parents, he could appoint an attorney for the 
child on his own discretion. 
The U. S. Supreme Court took the case on appeal and 
considered the constitutionality of the Juvenile Court as well 
as six specific due process rightso Justice Abe Fortas wrote 
the majority decision which reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's 
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Fortas, who was one of the Court's liberals, criticized 
the virtually unlimited discretion of juvenile court judges. 
He cited earlier Supreme Court cases involving ·the waiver of 
exclusive jurisdiction by juvenile courts and the use of coerced 
crlininal confessions, but these latest questions had not been yet 
addressed. The earlier cases dealt specifically with attempts to 
circumvent the letter and spirit of the juvenile court system 
in which the infancy of the offender was given special considera-
tiona In Gault, the Court had to deal with the whole rationale 
of that system as reflected in the proceedings themselves. 
Fortas reviewed the history and theory behind the juvenile 
court system. Juvenile courts are adaptations of earlier 
chancery courts. The courts' power to act in loco parentis 
is taken from chancery practice. 
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the 
child procedural rights available to his elders was 
elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, 
has a right 'not to liberty but to custody.9 
The child, in effect, had no rights of which to be deprived. 
9 
387 U. S. 1, at 17 
7 
Unfortunately, unbridled discretion, however benevolent in 
intention, is often very arbitrary in practice. This danger 
was acknowledged in the early literature on juvenile courts. 
Judge Edward Fe 'Vtaite of the District Court of Minneapolis 
held that departures from traditional safeguards in juvenile 
courts can mean that naIl that is necessary to justify a 
10 
despotism is to make sure it intends to be benevolent .. n 
Fortas saw in the procedural rules which have been 
developed for guaranteeing fairness 
our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation 
of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that 
life and our adversary methods present •••• 'P1ocedure is to 
law what I scientific method l is to science. ll 
Thus Fortas asserted the primacy of one profession's 
instruments, those of the law, over anothers' instruments, 
those of the juvenile court system. In effect, the Court was 
judging the claims of a distinct profession which, nevertheless, 
operated through the system of courts. Fortas weighed the 
supposed benefits of a sociological program and found it wanting 
according to the tools of his own sociological jurisprudence. 
He cited a study of the recidivism rate of juvenile offenders 
who were diverted from the regular criminal justice system 
and urged that the 
figures and the high crime rates among juveniles ••• could not 
lead us to conclude that the absence of constitutional 
protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system, 
functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely 
done, is effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders. 12 
10 
Edward F. 1.,raite, "How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized 
1r.J1 thout Impairing Ind i vidual Rights, n 12 Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 3 (November, 1921): 341. 
11 
387 u.s. 11 at 21 
12 
387 u.s. 1, at 22 
8 
He levelled other criticisms at the system including 
the disclosure of court records at the discretion of judges 
and the stigmatization of delinquency. The whole purpose 
of the system, he pointed out, was to wipe the juvenile 
offender's slate clean. The stigmatization of delinquency 
and the disclosure of records defeated this purpose. Moreover, 
Fortas claimed that procedural fairness, orderliness, and im-
partiality had a therapeutic effect and cited a study that 
found that 
when the procedural laxness of the 'parens patriae 1 
attitude is followed by stern disciplining, the contrast 
may have an adverse effect upon the child, who feels that 
he has been deceived or enticed. 13 
The conflicting testimony of experts points up a weakness 
in the epistemological underpinnings of a sociological juris-
prudence. Orthodoxies change. Yesterday.s leading theories 
may be todayfs bad science. But the law cannot be applied 
in a way that gives due recognition that the scientific conclusions 
of the day are part of an ongoing process o The law lacks that 
kind of fluidity, and to the extent that it approximates the 
fluidity of science it risks losing the authority and finality 
of law o Here is another kind of laxness that may adversely 
affect respect for law. Are the advantages of scientific up-
to-dateness that cons iderable, anyway:? Commenting on the welter 
of psychoanalytic theories that had succeeded each other over 
several generations of practice, the child psychologist, Robert 
Coles, concluded that 
All in all, what emerged were children to some extent 
unlike others before them, but nonetheless human. 
13 
387 u.s. 1, at 26 
9 
' ••• It is true that the children who grew up under its 
Ureferring to psychoanalysis] influence were in some 
respects different from earlier generations; but they 
were not freer from anxiety or from conflicts, and there-
fore not less exposed to neurotic and other mental 
illnesses,,'14 
Coles cited no one less than Anna Freud to this effect. 
The difficulty with the majority decision is that Justice Fortas 
easily could have chosen to attack the juvenile system on 
strictly constitutional grounds, as some of his colleagues dido 
Instead, he chose to pad his opinion with comments and justifi-
cations which risk quickly being overruled at the bar of science. 
With some justification, Fortas labelled the juvenile court as 
"a kangaroo court, tl but he wrote a decision that is vulnerable 
to a similarly contemptuous dismissal. Justice Harlan, who 
concurred in part and dissented in part, criticized the majority 
opinion for its vagueness: 
I must first acknowledge that I am unable to determine 
with any certainty by what standards the Court decides that 
Arizona's juvenile courts do not satisfy the obligations 
of due process. 15 
The majority was willing to preserve many of the concessions 
that juvenile courts made to the youth of the offenders, including 
the emphasis on rehabilitation and the avoidance of classifying 
the juveniles as criminah.. These unique benefits should not be 
sacrificed, Fortas said. But he saw incarceration in an "industrial 
school" as the equivalent to prison, no matter what euphemism 
waS used to describe it.. Rather than serving as a kind of 
protective custody, such incarceration exposed the offender to 
all of the perils of prison life. Yet the majority opinion 
14 
and 
Robert Coles, The Mind's Fate: Ways of Seeing Psychiatry 
p~~chOanalYSiS (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1975), 37-38. 
387 u.S. 1, at 66 
10 
held that only specified due process rights were obligatory 
for juvenile courts. These were the rights to adequate 
notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, a 
transcript of the proceedings, appellate review, and the 
privilege against self-incriminationo Subsequent decisions 
have further refined the list.. In ~ 'ltlinship extended the 
right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in cases where a 
juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime 
16 
if committed by an adult .. McKeiver v .. Pennsylvania, on the 
17 
other hand, did not extend the right to a jury trial .. 
Taken together, the Gault, Hinship, and McKeiver decisions 
have done anything but clarify the constitutional status of 
the juvenile system, despite Justice Fortas' earlier rationale 
for ruling on the issues, saying that "the constitutional and 
theoretical basis for this peculiar system is--to say the least--
18 
debatable. ft One must conclude that the juvenile court is a 
strange beast: part civil, part criminal, part judicial whim .. 
Commenting on Justice Fortas 1 remarks, Justice Harlan 
elaborated on the resulting confusion: 
The Court's premise, itself the product of reasoning which 
is not described, is that the 'constitutional and theoretical 
basis' of state systems of juvenile and family courts is 
'debatable'; it buttresses these doubts by marshaling a 
body of opinion which suggests that the accomplishments 
of these courts have often fallen short of expectations" 
The Court does not indicate at what points or for what 
purposes such views, held either by it or by other 
observers, might be pertinent to the present issues. Its 
failure to provide any discernible standard for the 
16 
397 u.s. 358, 90 s.ct .. 1068, 25 L .. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) 
17 
403 u.s .. 528, 91 SeCt. 1976, 29 L.Bd .. 2d 647 (1971) 
18 
387 u.s .. 1, at 17 
11 
measurement of due process in relation to juvenile 
proceedings unfortunately might be understood to mean 
that the Court is concerned principally with the wisdom 
of having such courts at all. 
If this is the source of the iCourt's dissatisfaction, 
I cannot share it.19 
Harlan and others liJ"ere concerned about the effect that 
formalization of court proceedings would have on the overall 
program. Harlan wanted to defer to legislators on substantive 
issues,which necessarily extend to procedural questions: 
20 
"Procedure at once reflects and creates substantive rights ....... tt 
He ~as willing, however, that three procedural requirements be 
extended to juvenile courts: timely notice of the nature an 
terms of the proceeding, timely notice of the right to counsel, 
and maintenance of a written record. 
Justice Black believed that a probably fatal blow was struck 
by the Court to much that was unique about the juvenile system. 
But he concurred with the result on a strict interpretation of 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and simply expressed the wish that 
Court had waited for a better opportunity for' squarely facing the 
issues. 
Justice lr!hite concurred with the result :T.n all areas except 
that of confrontation, self-incrimination, and cross-examinationo 
He doubted that the Miranda warning should be extended to a case 
that was decided before the Court's J1iranda decision.. Other than 
using this forum to express his continued displeasure at "unsound 
applications of the Fifth Amendment/!however, he agreed that the 
decision must be reversed .. 
19 
387 u.s. 1, at 67 
20 
387 u.s. 1, at 70 
12 
Only Justice Stewart dissented in full. He vIaS afraid that 
the Court was converting the juvenile system into a criminal 
prosecution. He noted that the parents knew of their right of 
counsel" and agreed with White I s observation that nno is sue of 
21 
compulsory self-incrimination [¥asJ presented by this case 0 tT 
The Court's decision, he said, was a step backwards into the 
nineteenth century when children were tried, sentenced, and 
executed as criminals. He also dissented from the Court's 
characterization of the juvenile system: 
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are 
not civil trials. They are sinwly not adversary pro-
ceedings.22 
Since the Gault decision, some efforts have been made to 
assess its impact. The use of attorneys and public defenders, 
in particular, has been examined by social scientists o One 
study of a juvenile court's records for a two-year period 
straddling the Gault decision drew the following conclusions: 
An increase in the presence of counsel and the number of 
dismissals and a reduction in the number of cases reaching 
adjudication and disposition indicate a shift toward 
legal fact-findingo A reduction in the number of juveniles 
placed on probation and an increase in the use of fines 
may inoicate less emphasis on treatment •• 0 UoutJ may allow 
more individualized treatment~ thereby fulfilling a 
primary promise of the court. 3 
Another study made in a large midwestern city dealt with 
the role of the public defender, "whose 345 delinquency cases 
account for eighty-seven percent of his total caseload during 
21 
387 u.S. 1, at 81 
22 
387 u.S. 1, at 78 
23 
Charles E. Reasons, "Gault: Procedural Change and Sub-
stantive Effect,U 16 Crime and TelinquencI, 2 (April, 1970): 171. 
13 
the year .. n \,Tith such a heavy caseload, the public defender 
cannot hope to do justice to the merits of each case but his 
efforts have a decided effAct: 
Comparing defendants with and without the services of the 
public defender suggests that the public defender's clients 
stand a better chance of having their case dismissed or 
receiving probation .. 24 
The effect of the Gault decision, and that of several 
other Warren era cases, has been to add to escalating court 
costs without providing specific guidelines for adjusting to 
these innovations. The thrust of the 1960s
' 
civil rights 
movement had the positive value of compelling courts and other 
institutions to pay greater attention to the rights of individuals. 
Its impact on social rights and obligations, however, has been 
more problematic. Individual rights have both private and public 
value. Violations harm both individuals and society. On the 
other hand, social life assumes lrnowledge of its rules' and the 
ability to live according to them. If everyone lacked the 
capacity to live lawfully, society would be impossible. As it is, 
people only imperfectly abide by the rules" This being the case, 
a tension persists between the requirements of society and 
fairness to the uniqueness of individuals that does not lend 
itself to procedural uniformity. So courts assign priorities, 
as do legislatures. On the whole, the balance has tilted so 
much toward guaranteeing procedural fairness according to a 
certain conception of professionalism that the result is economically 
insupportable" For instance, the last Oregon legislative session 
24 
Anthony Platt" Howard Schechter" and Phyllis Tiffany, ?tIn 
Defense of Youth: A Case Study of the Public Defender in Juvenile 
Court," in The Children of Ishmael: Critical Perspectives on Juven-
ile Justice;E3d" Barry Krisberg and James Austin (Palo Alto: 
Mayfield Publishing Company, 1978), pc 351. 
14 
revised the fee schedule for attorneys handling indigent cases. 
As a result, 1'1u1tnomah County had to shif.t $900,000 within its 
budget to cover the expected cost increase. In a condition of 
scarce resources" judicial determinations about procedural 
fairness can give rise to a new profession, like that of the 
public defender, and further strain government finances. A 
sizable portion of the increase will cover the attorney fees of 
indigent families of youthful offenders o 
This is an area that is in need of innovative thinkingo The 
original creation of tDA il1'ITAnilA I'nT!'d";em reflected the nAY'CAnt.irm 
-- t,}--"------ -u- -- - - --- - . ..1:""-- --.r;:------
of reformers that the problems of juvenile lawbreaking could not 
be dealt with by the criminal courts. The Supreme Court in its 
Gault decision introduced some procedural changes to salvage 
what it regarded as a defective but necessary vehicle for 
dealing with contemporary lawbreaking. But it undermined the 
informality in which lay the key to the system's operation and 
supposed therapeutic effect. Perhaps the solution, in part, is 
to transfer some of the functions of juvenile courts to other 
agencies and attempt to subdue escalating costs through new 
means of handling complaints. The whole concept of the reforma-
tory, like that of the penitentiary, has perhaps outlived its 
original rationale and its harmful effects demand a thoughtful" 
if imperfect, remedy. Similar problems beset public education, 
the military, and other institutions that have traditionally 
regulated young people. The times and our expectations 
are changing. The initiative must not just be left with the 
courts. 
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